Infrastructure Contracts: Trust and Institutional Updating

نویسندگان
چکیده

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Review of Industrial Organization

سال: 2009

ISSN: 0889-938X,1573-7160

DOI: 10.1007/s11151-009-9221-4