منابع مشابه
Informative Voting in Large Elections∗
In the seminal paper on voting games with private information, AustenSmith and Banks (1996) derived the provocative result that informative voting is not an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the size of the electorate is large. We show that this result may depend on too strong an assumption about what voters know about the informativeness of other voters’ ballots. We add the possib...
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Mining transaction databases for association rules usually generates a large number of rules, most of which are unnecessary when used for subsequent prediction. In this paper we define a rule set for a given transaction database that is much smaller than the association rule set but makes the same predictions as the association rule set by the confidence priority. We call this subset the inform...
متن کاملProbabilistic Borda rule voting
An alternative voting system, referred to as probabilistic Borda rule, is developed and analyzed. The winning alternative under this system is chosen by lottery where the weights are determined from each alternative’s Borda score relative to all Borda points possible. Advantages of the lottery include the elimination of strategic voting on the set of alternatives under consideration and breakin...
متن کاملA theory of hung juries and informative voting
This paper investigates a jury decision when hung juries and retrials are possible. When jurors in subsequent trials know that previous trials resulted in hung juries, informative voting cannot be an equilibrium regardless of voting rules unless the probability that each juror receives the correct signal when the defendant is guilty is identical to the one when he is innocent. Thus, while Cough...
متن کاملStrategic Voting under the Qualified Majority Rule
This is an analysis of strategic voting under the qualified majority rule. Existing formal analyses of the plurality rule predict the complete coordination of strategic voting: A strict interpretation of Duverger’s Law. This conclusion is rejected. Unlike previous models, the popular support for each option is not commonly certain. Agents base their vote on both public and private signals of po...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.933600