Informational Smallness and the Scope for Limiting Information Rents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Informational smallness and the scope for limiting information rents
For an incomplete-information model of public-good provision with interim participation constraints, we show that e¢ cient outcomes can be approximated, with approximately full surplus extraction, when there are many agents and each agent is informationally small. The result holds even if agents payo¤s cannot be unambiguously inferred from their beliefs, i.e., even if the so-called BDP propert...
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The optimal mechanism literature shows that the principal can extract all the equilibrium payoffs at a given Bayesian Game when the players’ information is correlated. For this result to hold, the principal needs to know how informative are the agents’ signals. If the principal does not know how noisy the signal of a player is, or equivalently, when the signals available to a player can be rank...
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We amend an error in [S. Parreiras, Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents, J. of Econ. Theory 123 (2005) 210–217]. Consequently, it is in general not possible to reinterpret a mechanism design model that violates the spanning condition of Crémer and McLean [Econometrica 56 (1988) 1247–1258] as one in which agents hold private information about the informativeness of t...
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The paper analyses the existence and efficiency of discretionary industrial assistance schemes under asymmetric information between an uninformed government and a uniform distribution of firms with differing productivities. Discretionary assistance allows the government to scrutinise projects in an effort to learn the type, which can reduce the ‘informational rents’ of automatic assistance, whe...
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We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are close to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the public signal once they are aggregated into a public signal by some public coordination device. A player...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1463254