Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games
We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are close to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the public signal once they are aggregated into a public signal by some public coordination device. A player...
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In the last couple of classes, we looked at repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, and studied perfect public equilibria of these games. These equilibria had a very nice recursive structure. But what happens if the outcome in each period is not commonly observed? In this case, we have a repeated game with imperfect private monitoring. Relatively little is known about the structure of ...
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I consider repeated games with private monitoring played on a social network. Each player has a set of neighbors with whom he interacts: a player’s payoff depends on his own and his neighbors’ actions only. Monitoring is private and imperfect: each player observes his stage payoff but not his neighbors’ actions. I introduce costless communication among players at each stage: communication can b...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.796946