Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty
In McLean and Postlewaite (Econometrica 56, 1992, p. 2421), we analyzed pure exchange economies with asymmetrically informed agents. We defined a notion of informational size and showed that, when the aggregate information of all agents resolves nearly all the uncertainty regarding the state of nature, the conflict between incentive compatibility and (ex post) efficiency can be made small if ag...
متن کاملINFORMATIONAL SIZE AND INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY By Richard
We examine a general equilibrium model with asymmetrically informed agents. The presence of asymmetric information generally presents a conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency. We present a notion of informational size and show that the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are of sufficiently small informational s...
متن کاملCARESS Working Paper # 99 - 14 Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
We examine a general equilibrium model with asymetrically informed agents. The presence of asymmetric information generally presents a con°ict between incentive compatibility and Pareto e±ciency. We present a notion of informational size and show that the con°ict between incentive compatibility and e±ciency can be made arbitrarily small if agents are su±ciently small informationally .
متن کاملInformational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information
We study the ex ante incentive compatible core, and provide conditions under which the ex ante incentive compatible core is nonempty when agents are informationally small in the sense of McLean and Postlewaite (2002a, Econometrica, 70, 2421–2453). 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C71; D51; D82
متن کاملInformational Frictions, Induced Uncertainty, and Aggregate Wealth Accumulation∗
In this paper we examine implications of model uncertainty due to robustness (RB) for consumption, welfare, and aggregate savings under limited informationprocessing capacity (rational inattention or RI) in an otherwise standard permanent income model with filtering. We first solve the robust permanent income models with inattentive consumers and show that RI by itself creats an additional dema...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00185-4