منابع مشابه
Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents’ signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome. Furthermore, we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders wi...
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We study the inherent limitations of natural widely-used classes of ascending combinatorial auctions. Specifically, we show that ascending combinatorial auctions that do not use both non-linear prices and personalized prices can not achieve social efficiency with general bidder valuations. This casts doubt on the performance that can be achieved using the simpler auctions suggested, e.g., by Kw...
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We study the effects of allocative and informational externalities in (multi-object) auctions and related mechanisms. Such externalities naturally arise in models that embed auctions in larger economic contexts. In particular, they appear when there is downstream interaction among bidders after the auction has closed. The endogeneity of valuations is the main driving force behind many new, spec...
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We analyze the value of being better informed than one’s rival in a two bidder, second price common value auction. In order to do so, we must pare down the continuum of equilibria that typically exists in this setting. We propose selecting an equilibrium that is robust to perturbing the common value of the object with small private value components. Under this selection, we show that having bet...
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We exhibit an efficient auction (an auction that maximizes surplus conditional on all available information). For private values, the Vickrey auction (for one good) or its Groves-Clarke extension (for multiple goods) is efficient. We show that the Vickrey and Groves-Clarke auctions can be generalized to attain efficiency when there are common values, if each buyer’s information can be represent...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2004
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937x.2004.00305.x