Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Informational Lobbying and Legislative Voting
I analyze a model of interest group influence on legislative voting through information transmission. The model shows how interest groups may craft different messages to target different winning coalitions in order to influence the outcome. If access to legislators is costly then interest groups prefer to coordinate with allied legislators by providing them with information that helps them to p...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Journal of Political Science
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0092-5853
DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12249