Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Informational Lobbying and Agenda Distortion
This paper challenges the prevailing view that strict informational lobbying (in the absence of political contributions and evidence distortion) leads to better policy outcomes. Key to our analysis is the fact that policymakers are constrained on the number of issues they can address, which forces them to prioritize issues. We show how interest groups advocating reform on less-important issues ...
متن کاملInformational Lobbying and Legislative Voting
I analyze a model of interest group influence on legislative voting through information transmission. The model shows how interest groups may craft different messages to target different winning coalitions in order to influence the outcome. If access to legislators is costly then interest groups prefer to coordinate with allied legislators by providing them with information that helps them to p...
متن کاملInformational Lobbying and Competition for Access
There is substantial evidence that political contributions buy access to politicians. This paper incorporates access into a model of informational lobbying, then uses the access framework to analyze the impact of contribution limits on policy outcomes and representative citizen welfare. In the competition for access model, interest groups provide contributions to a politician and those that pro...
متن کاملWho Cares About the Lobbying Agenda?
David C. Kimball*, Frank R. Baumgartner, Jeffrey M. Berry, Marie Hojnacki, Beth L. Leech and Bryce Summary Department of Political Science, University of Missouri–St. Louis, One University Blvd., 347 SSB, St Louis, MO 63121-4499, USA. Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Campus Box 3265, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3265, USA. Department of Political Science, Tufts University...
متن کاملInformational and monetary lobbying: Expert politicians, good decisions?
This paper investigates informational and monetary lobbying. In a setting with two opposing groups, the incentive to provide unbiased information may stem from the desire (i) to reduce the bribes required in order to obtain a favorable decision (ii) to raise rival’s costs and (iii) to avoid a low utility if the politician is biased against the group due to his own imperfect information. A major...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
سال: 2016
ISSN: 8756-6222,1465-7341
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/eww005