Informational control and organizational design
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Informational control and organizational design
This paper focuses on issues of allocating authority between an uninformed principal and an informed expert. We analyze the benefits of informational control—restricting the precision of the expert’s information (without learning its content). In this case, the result of Dessein (2002) [8] that delegating decisions to a perfectly informed expert is better than communication when preferences bet...
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Many corporate mergers fail to achieve their intended objectives. The literature indicates that slow post-merger integrations are partly responsible for such failure and highlights that a successful post-merger integration is essential to a successful merger. Recognizing the fact that information systems (IS) integration is important for effective merger performance and that few IS and merger r...
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The optimal mechanism literature shows that the principal can extract all the equilibrium payoffs at a given Bayesian Game when the players’ information is correlated. For this result to hold, the principal needs to know how informative are the agents’ signals. If the principal does not know how noisy the signal of a player is, or equivalently, when the signals available to a player can be rank...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.11.002