منابع مشابه
Overconfidence and Informational Cascades∗
This paper combines behavioral economics and social learning. Overconfident agents overweigh their private information relative to the public information revealed by the decisions of others. Therefore, when following a herd, they broadcast more of the information available to them. However, overconfidence trades the additional information revealed by overconfident decisions against more informa...
متن کاملLogical Models of Informational Cascades
In this paper, we investigate the social herding phenomenon known as informational cascades, in which sequential inter-agent communication might lead to epistemic failures at group level, despite availability of information that should be sufficient to track the truth. We model an example of a cascade, and check the correctness of the individual reasoning of each agent involved, using two alter...
متن کاملConversation, Observational Learning, and Informational Cascades
Conversation, Learning and Informational Cascades We offer a model to explain why groups of people sometimes converge upon poor decisions and are prone to fads, even though they can discuss the outcomes of their choices. Models of informational herding or cascades have examined how rational individuals learn by observing predecessors’ actions, and show that when individuals stop using their own...
متن کاملInformational cascades in Galton-Watson trees
Information cascades have been studied in the literature where myopic selfish users sequentially appear and make a decision to buy a product based on their private observation about the value of the product and actions of their predecessors. Bikhchandani et. al (1992) and Banerjee (1992) introduced such a model and showed that after a finite time almost surely, users discard their private infor...
متن کاملInformational Cascades with Endogenous Prices: the Role of Risk Aversion
In this paper we show that long run market informational ine¢ ciency and informational cascades can easily happen when trades occur at market clearing prices. We consider a sequential trade model where: (i) the investorsset of actions is discrete; (ii) dealers and investors di¤er in risk aversion; (iii) investorsinformation is bounded. We show that informational cascade occurs as soon as trad...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.06.005