Information transparency, fairness and labor market efficiency
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information transparency, fairness and labor market efficiency
The paper studies the role of information transparency on fairness concerns, welfare and e ciency. When the rm's productivity and ultimately pro ts are revealed, wage o ers induce relatively fair divisions of potential gains and workers respond with higher performance. Workers respond not only to wages but also to rms' intentions concerning fairness. Information transparency serves as a mechani...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 2214-8043
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2015.06.005