Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games
This paper shows how to characterize the set of outcomes functions that can be supported as equilibrium outcome functions in competing mechanism games. We describe a set of mechanisms we refer to as reciprocal mechanisms. It is show that the set of outcome functions supportable as equilibria in a game in which principals offer reciprocal mechanisms is the same as the set of outcomes supportable...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1885606