Information Redundancy Neglect versus Overconfidence: A Social Learning Experiment
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study social learning in a continuous action space experiment. Subjects, acting sequence, state their beliefs about the value of good after observing predecessors’ statements and private signal. compare behavior laboratory with Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium prediction predictions bounded rationality models decision-making: redundancy information neglect model overconfidence model. The results our experiment are line at odds others’. (JEL C91, D12, D82, D83)
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Information redundancy neglect versus overconfidence: a social learning experiment
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1945-7669', '1945-7685']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180394