Information Indices with High Discriminative Power for Graphs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information Indices with High Discriminative Power for Graphs
In this paper, we evaluate the uniqueness of several information-theoretic measures for graphs based on so-called information functionals and compare the results with other information indices and non-information-theoretic measures such as the well-known Balaban J index. We show that, by employing an information functional based on degree-degree associations, the resulting information index out...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: PLoS ONE
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1932-6203
DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0031214