INFORMATION EXTERNALITIES, SHARE-PRICE BASED INCENTIVES AND MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOUR
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information provision and behaviour-based price discrimination
This article examines a model wherein firms first advertise their existence to consumers and, in the two following periods, compete with uniform pricing and then with behaviour-based price discrimination. I show that allowing firms to price discriminate can restore symmetry in equilibrium advertising decisions. I also establish that price discrimination increases (resp. decreases) profits and t...
متن کاملManagerial Incentives and Competition
This paper experimentally tests the impact of managerial incentives on competitive (market) outcomes. We use a Cournot duopoly game to show that when managers’ incentives are based on the firm’s absolute performance (profits), collusion can be sustained. However, when managers’ incentives are based on the firm’s relative performance (their profits relative to the other firm’s profits), this dri...
متن کاملIncentives and Information Asymmetry of Managerial Talent in Executive Compensation
We test for information structure in executive compensation. The optimal compensation contract in the principal agent model implies that incentives increase with the level of managerial talent only if information about managerial talent is asymmetric in that executives have better information than shareholders. We find positive relations between the payperformance sensitivity and the level of m...
متن کاملManagerial Information Behaviour: Relationships among Total Quality Management Orientation, Information Use Environments, and Managerial Roles
This paper integrates disparate literatures to develop a summary model that proposes how different orientations (control or learning) toward a major organizational change effort, Total Quality Management, will generate different managerial information use environments, will require different managerial roles, and will thus involve different managerial information behaviours, in order to foster ...
متن کاملManagerial Motivation Dynamics and Incentives
Firms can increase profitability by appropriately motivating managers. We investigate drivers of managerial motivation, and propose how firms can use performance-pay to alter motivational patterns. We focus on the agent’s optimal effort decision in trading off compensation utility with effort cost in a static and dynamic setting. Surprisingly, we find that lower risk aversion or increased pay a...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Surveys
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0950-0804,1467-6419
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6419.1996.tb00001.x