Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance
Disclosure is widely assumed to play an important role in corporate governance. Yet governance has not been the focus of previous academic analyses of disclosure. We consider disclosure in the context of corporate governance. We argue that disclosure is a two-edged sword. On one side, disclosure of information permits principals to make better decisions. On the other, it can create or exacerbat...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Finance
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0022-1082
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01710.x