Information control in reputational cheap talk
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Reputational cheap talk∗
This paper analyzes information reporting by a privately informed expert concerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert’s reputation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to deviate from truthtelling are characterized and shown to depend on th...
متن کاملReputational cheap talk with misunderstanding
We consider a cheap talk game with a sender who has a reputational concern for an ability to predict a state of the world correctly, and where receivers may misunderstand the message sent. When communication between the sender and each receiver is private, we identify an equilibrium in which the sender only discloses the least noisy information. Hence, what determines the amount of information ...
متن کاملSupplementary Material on Reputational Cheap Talk
In Ottaviani and Sørensen, henceforth OS, (2004b), we have formulated a model of strategic communication by an expert concerned about being perceived to be well informed. In that model, the expert observes a private signal informative about the state of the world. The amount of information about the state contained in this signal is parametrized by the expert's ability, assumed for simplicity t...
متن کاملInformation Transmission with Cheap and Almost-Cheap Talk∗
Communication in practice typically occurs through multiple channels, not all of which permit costless misrepresentation of private information. Accordingly, I study a model of strategic information transmission based on Crawford and Sobel (1982), but allow for communication through both cheap talk and messages on a second dimension where misreporting is costly. Using a forward-induction refine...
متن کاملInformation Transmission with Almost-Cheap Talk
Misrepresenting private information is often costly, for technological, legal, or psychological reasons. I develop a model of strategic information transmission based on Crawford and Sobel (1982) (CS), but with a convex cost of lying or misreporting. There are three main results. First, I prove that a sequence of monotone equilibria converges to a CS equilibrium as the cost of misreporting shri...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.09.010