Information availability at the competitive bidding stage for service contracts

Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information

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How competitive is competitive bidding?

An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Hedge Contracts on Bidding Behavior in a Competitive

A major concern in the design of wholesale electricity markets is the potential for the exercise of market power by generating unit owners. To better understand the determinants of generating unit owner market power and how it is exercised, this paper derives a model of bidding behavior in a competitive electricity market which incorporates various sources of uncertainty and the impact of the e...

A correction to uniqueness in “Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information”

In this note I show that there is a mistake in the proof of uniqueness in Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber’s seminal “Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information” and provide a correct proof. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C7; D44

Minimizing Loss of Information at Competitive PLIP Algorithms for Image Segmentation with Noisy Back Ground

In this paper, two training systems for selecting PLIP parameters have been demonstrated. The first compares the MSE of a high precision result to that of a lower precision approximation in order to minimize loss of information. The second uses EMEE scores to maximize visual appeal and further reduce information loss. It was shown that, in the general case of basic addition, subtraction, or mul...