Information Asymmetry and the Market Response to Open Market Share Repurchases
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information Signaling or Agency Conflicts: What Explains Canadian Open Market Share Repurchases?
This paper examines open market share repurchases in Canada (called Normal Course Issuer Bids—NCIB). Similar to announcements of U.S. open market share repurchases, announcements of Canadian NCIBs are accompanied by a positive stock price reaction. If NCIBs signal information, then it is not in the same manner as U.S. repurchases. Canadian firms usually announce the legal maximum proportion of ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2403377