Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem

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چکیده

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Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies

سال: 1982

ISSN: 0034-6527

DOI: 10.2307/2297362