Information and Cost Asymmetry in Experimental Duopoly Markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economics and Statistics
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0034-6535,1530-9142
DOI: 10.1162/003465397556647