Information aggregation with runoff voting
نویسندگان
چکیده
A majority of truth-seeking voters wants to choose the alternative that better matches state world, but may disagree on which is best match due private information. When we have an arbitrary number alternatives and sophisticated partisan exist in electorate, electing correct challenging. We show multi-round runoff voting achieves asymptotically full-information equivalence. That is, when society large, it can lead election under fairly general assumptions regarding information structure partisans' preferences.
منابع مشابه
Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1095-7235', '0022-0531']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105130