Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Political Science Review
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0003-0554,1537-5943
DOI: 10.2307/2082796