Information Aggregation, Investment, and Managerial Incentives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Uncertainty , Investment , and Managerial Incentives ∗
This study provides evidence that managerial incentives, shaped by compensation contracts, help to explain the empirical relationship between uncertainty and investment. We develop a model in which the manager, induced by an incentive contract, makes investment decisions for a firm that faces time-varying volatility. In the model, a manager’s privately optimal investment response to a volatilit...
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In response to accounting scandals, market control systems (e.g. regulations related to internal control systems) have become more stringent in order to restore investors’ confidence in capital markets. Tightening control systems has triggered a fierce debate on its effect on both capital markets and the real economy. My dissertation studies how mitigating earnings management by tightening cont...
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Many firms tie the compensation of their managers to financial performance. Such performance based compensation is commonly explained as a means of providing managers with incentives to exert effort to increase the profits of the firm. However, we explore an alternative role that performance based compensation can play: By providing management with appropriate incentives, a compensation plan ca...
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This paper experimentally tests the impact of managerial incentives on competitive (market) outcomes. We use a Cournot duopoly game to show that when managers’ incentives are based on the firm’s absolute performance (profits), collusion can be sustained. However, when managers’ incentives are based on the firm’s relative performance (their profits relative to the other firm’s profits), this dri...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1909809