منابع مشابه
Delay in Strategic Information Aggregation Delay in Strategic Information Aggregation
We study a model of collective decision making in which agents vote on the decision repeatedly until they agree, with the agents receiving no exogenous new information between two voting rounds but incurring a delay cost. Although preference conflict between the agents makes information aggregation impossible in a single round of voting, in the equilibrium of the repeated voting game agents are...
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As tourism is an information business, tourists have to rely on the information available beforehand. One – prominent – source of information are call centres of national or regional tourism organisations, which provide users expert advise and also pre-compiled information documents and brochures. However, such requests are usually answered with on demand off and on-line searches, communicating...
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متن کاملDelay in Strategic Information Aggregation
We study a model of collective decision making in which divergent preferences of the agents make information aggregation impossible in a single round of voting. With costly delay, we show that repeated voting can help the agents reach a mutually preferred decision, even though there is no new direct information about the decision between two rounds of voting. An increase in the cost of delay ca...
متن کاملInformation Aggregation in Search Committees
This paper examines how information is aggregated by a committee that has to decide when to end search. Each period, committee members observe private signals about the current alternatives, then vote whether to accept one of these alternatives or continue searching. In a pure common values setting, we extend the result of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) to this dynamic environment: the only voti...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.864