Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets Under Ambiguity
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
To “ Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Strategic Traders ”
STEP 0: Suppose that for some ε > 0, the statement is not true. Then one can find an increasing sequence m1, m2, etc., such that for any j, in equilibrium (S∗ mj Y ∗ mj ), E[|yKmj − X(ω)|] ≥ ε. Consider this sequence for the rest of the proof. For notational convenience, without loss of generality, we assume that m1 = 1, m2 = 2, etc.; that is, we have a sequence of games ΓKm and corresponding e...
متن کاملDynamic Choice under Ambiguity
This paper analyzes sophisticated dynamic choice for ambiguity-sensitive decision makers. It characterizes Backward Induction and a single-person version of Subgame Perfection via axioms on preferences over decision trees. Furthermore, it indicates how to elicit conditional preferences from prior preferences. The key axiom is a weakening of Dynamic Consistency, deemed Sophistication. The analys...
متن کاملAgent based information aggregation markets
8 8; 8 8$ ; &8 8 8 8 < 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 %8. '8 8 '8 < 8 8 @ 8 A8 8 '8 8 8 8 8 8 8 %8 8 8 8 ; 8 8 '8 8 8 '8 8 8 8 < 8 '8 8 8 8 8 8 8 B 8 8 < %8 C 8 8 8 ' '8 < 8 ; 8 8< 8 8 8 8 8 %8 ; 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 ' 8 8 '8 '8 8 8 < 8 8 8 8 8 %8 8 8 8 < 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 ; %8 C 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 < 8 <8 8 8 8 ; 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 < 8 8 %8
متن کاملPreconditions for Information Aggregation in Prediction Markets
We study necessary and sufficient conditions for information to aggregate in a stylized one-shot unit-demand uniform-price prediction market. We show that, in the increasing symmetric equilibrium, the market price properly aggregates information if and only if (i) the number of realized trades is non-negligible compared to number of market participants, and (ii) there is no uncertainty about th...
متن کاملSecurity Design and Information Aggregation in Markets
It has been well-recognized that markets can aggregate less-than-perfect information across market participants. With two differently designed securities, this work examines the impact of security design on the information aggregation ability of markets in laboratory experiments. Results show that markets with one security aggregate information significantly better than markets with the other s...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3187678