Information aggregation in competitive markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study when equilibrium prices can aggregate information in an auction market with a large population of traders. Our main result identifies property information—the betweenness property—that is both necessary and sufficient for aggregation. The characterization provides novel predictions about complex, multidimensional environments.
منابع مشابه
Competitive Markets and Aggregate Information
A frequently asked question is, how informationally efficient are market prices? In answering this question, economists commonly model the price formation process as one of tâtonnement where agents revise their beliefs until a market-clearing price is established. The Walrasian market thus aggregates all relevant information about an asset and yields a strong-form efficient price. A second appr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1555-7561', '1933-6837']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3982/te3559