Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information aggregation in auctions with an unknown number of bidders
Information aggregation, a key concern for uniform-price, common-value auctions with many bidders, has been characterized in models where bidders know exactly how many rivals they face. A model allowing for uncertainty over the number of bidders is essential for capturing a critical condition for information to aggregate: as the numbers of winning and losing bidders grow large, information aggr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.06.002