Information aggregation in a prediction market for climate outcomes
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Energy Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0140-9883
DOI: 10.1016/j.eneco.2018.06.002