Information Aggregation and Policy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
origins of armenia’s foreign policy and its foreign policy towards iran
foreign policy takes root from complicated matters. however, this issue may be more truth about armenia. although the new government of armenia is less than 20 years, people of this territory are the first ones who officially accepted christianity. in very past times, these people were a part of great emperors like iran, rome, and byzantium.armenia is regarded as a nation with a privileged hist...
15 صفحه اولDelay in Strategic Information Aggregation Delay in Strategic Information Aggregation
We study a model of collective decision making in which agents vote on the decision repeatedly until they agree, with the agents receiving no exogenous new information between two voting rounds but incurring a delay cost. Although preference conflict between the agents makes information aggregation impossible in a single round of voting, in the equilibrium of the repeated voting game agents are...
متن کاملInformation Aggregation and Group Decisions∗
Individuals with identical preferences each receive a signal about the unknown state of the world and separately decide upon a utilitymaximizing recommendation on the basis of that signal. The group’s decision maximizes the common utility function based on perfect pooling of individual information. With no restrictions on the information structure, the individual recommendations place no constr...
متن کاملVote Timing and Information Aggregation
Drawing upon recent results on bandwagons in sequential voting, and by deriving analogous results for simultaneous voting, I compare the information aggregation properties of the two processes. The conclusions con...rm commonly held views about the front-loading of presidential primaries: that in tight races a simultaneous vote is preferred as it is more likely to lead to the selection of the “...
متن کاملManipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation∗
We study information aggregation with a biased election organizer who recruits voters at some cost. Voters are symmetric ex-ante and prefer policy a in state A and policy b in state B, but the organizer prefers policy a regardless of the state. Each recruited voter observes a private signal that is imperfectly informative about the unknown state, but does not learn the size of the electorate. I...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 1982
ISSN: 0034-6527
DOI: 10.2307/2297138