Information aggregation and communication in committees

Information Aggregation in Search Committees

This paper examines how information is aggregated by a committee that has to decide when to end search. Each period, committee members observe private signals about the current alternatives, then vote whether to accept one of these alternatives or continue searching. In a pure common values setting, we extend the result of Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) to this dynamic environment: the only voti...

Information Aggregation and Equilibrium Selection in Committees

Consistency and communication in committees

This paper analyzes truthtelling incentives in pre-vote communication in heterogeneous committees. We generalize the classical Condorcet jury model by introducing a new informational structure that captures consistency of information. In contrast to the impossibility result shown by Coughlan (2000) for the classical model, full pooling of information followed by sincere voting is an equilibrium...

the relationship of wtc with communication apprehension and self-perceived communication competene in english and persian context

بیشتر تحقیقات پیشین در زمینه تمایل به برقراری ارتباط به رابطه آن با عوامل فردی چون سن، جنس، نوع شخصیت و... صورت گرفته است. در صورتی که مطالعات کمتری به بررسی رابطه تمایل به برقراری ارتباط زبان آموزان فارسی زبان با ترس از برقراری ارتباط و توانش خود ادراکانه آنها در برقراری ارتباط در محیط فارسی و انگلیسی انجام شده است. بر اساس نظریه الیس (2008) تمایل به برقراری ارتباط جایگاه مهمی در زمینه آموزش م...

Information acquisition in committees

The goal of this paper is to illustrate the signi cance of information acquisition in mechanism design. We provide a stark example of a mechanism design problem in a collective choice environment with information acquisition. We concentrate on committees that are comprised of agents sharing a common goal and having a joint task. Members of the committee decide whether to acquire costly informat...