Inflation—unemployment choices in New Zealand and the median voter theorem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Bargaining foundations of the median voter theorem
We provide strong game-theoretic foundations for the median voter theorem in a onedimensional bargaining model based on Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) model of distributive politics. We prove that, as the agents become arbitrarily patient, the set of proposals that can be passed in any subgame perfect equilibrium collapses to the median voter’s ideal point. While we leave the possibility of some d...
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متن کاملthe politics of consumption taxes: globalization and the median voter
the regressive nature of consumption taxes poses a challenge to partisan theory. using data for up to 20 oecd countries in the period 1970-2003 this article aims to explore the question of whether the idea that social democratic governments typically have to compromise on policy goals and core constituency interests to make themselves more appealing to the median voter necessitates the use of r...
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pendence of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ, New Zealand’s central bank) and set the single objective of price stability for the country’s monetary policy, came into force in 1990. The first Policy Targets Agreement (PTA) specifically defining the inflation target was signed in March of that year. However, in New Zealand the adoption of the concept and practice of inflation targeting, in ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 1991
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90009-a