Inflation, Tariffs and Tax Enforcement Costs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Inflation Aversion and the Optimal Inflation Tax
The optimal inflation tax is reexamined in the framework of dynamic second best economy populated by individuals with inflation aversion. A simple formula for the optimal inflation rate is derived. Different from the literature, it is shown that if the marginal excess burden of other distorting taxes approaches zero, Friedman’s rule for optimum quantity of money is not optimal, and the optimal ...
متن کاملTax evasion and the optimal inflation tax
We developed a simple monetary model to study the effects of tax evasion on the optimal inflation tax. The model is constructed so that inflation might be an indirect way of taxing the underground sector of the economy. We show that while there are theoretical reasons for positive optimal inflation rates, the effects are quantitatively small, even in countries with large underground sectors. We...
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When there is tax evasion, increased randomness about how much taxable income an auditor would assess generally leads to higher reported income and more revenue. When reducing randomness is costly, optimality requires some randomness in assessed taxable income. Even if reducing randomness is costless, taxpayers may prefer some randomness when the increased revenue can be rebated, so that the go...
متن کاملRandomized Tax Enforcement Messages
Increasing tax revenue and reducing tax evasion is a key challenge for tax administrations around the world, particularly in developing countries. This paper presents a methodology to generate information to optimize audit strategies. Randomly selected taxpayers are presented with a deterrence message, and their subsequent tax payments are compared to a control group. This allows estimating wha...
متن کاملTax Enforcement and Tax Havens under Formula Apportionment
In this paper, we consider optimal tax enforcement policy in the presence of pro t shifting towards tax havens. We show that, under separate accounting, tax enforcement levels may be too high due to negative scal externalities. In contrast, under formula apportionment, tax enforcement is likely to be too low due to positive externalities of tax enforcement. Our results challenge recent contrib...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Integration
سال: 1987
ISSN: 1225-651X,1976-5525
DOI: 10.11130/jei.1987.2.2.12