Inflation and Taxation with Optimizing Governments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Inflation and Taxation with Optimizing Governments
This paper examines the empirical validity of the prediction that if governments minimize the deadweight loss from raising revenue through inflation and tax finance, there should be a positive contemporaneous association between inflation and the level of tax burdens. We examine the empirical validity of this prediction using data from Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States. Inf...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
سال: 1990
ISSN: 0022-2879
DOI: 10.2307/1992124