Inferentialist Truth Pluralism

Abstract Metasemantic inferentialism has gained popularity in the last few decades. Traditionally, is combined with a deflationary attitude towards semantic terms such as truth and reference, i.e., many inferentialists hold that when we use these do not purport to refer substantive properties. This combination makes attractive for philosophers who see themselves antirealists. Although attractions of combining deflationism are easy see, also controversial position. For one, deflationists maintain an insubstantive property, but it altogether clear what property is. Secondly, does play explanatory role, incompatible position can explain normativity talk. Given faces objections, would be preferable if success did depend on deflationist’s ability respond objections. I argue someone attracted its accommodate antirealist intuitions about domain (e.g. morality) committed truth. More specifically, will show straightforward account inferentialist truth-conditions compatible version pluralism. call this Inferentialist Truth Pluralism.