Inequity averse optimization in operational research
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Inequity averse optimization in operational research
There are many applications across a broad range of business problem domains in which equity is a concern and many well-known operational research (OR) problems such as knapsack, scheduling or assignment problems have been considered from an equity perspective. This shows that equity is both a technically interesting concept and a substantial practical concern. In this paper we review the opera...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Operational Research
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0377-2217
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2015.02.035