Inequality persistence through vertical vs. horizontal coalitions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Development Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0304-3878
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.09.012