منابع مشابه
Team versus individual behavior in the minimum effort coordination game
We compare coordination success of individuals and teams in the minimum effort coordination game. The game is played by groups of either five individuals or five two-person teams with either fixed or random re-matching protocols. When groups are fixed, teams perform at least as well as individuals, if not better, in terms of coordinating to the payoff dominant outcome. But with random re-matchi...
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We focus on the effects of changing costs of effort in the minimum-effort coordination game. We find three main results. First, as the cost of effort increases, the level of effort decreases. Second, as the cost of effort increases, the convergence speed to an equilibrium also increases. Third, the overall efficiency (average payoff) does not monotonically decrease as the cost of effort increas...
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This paper revisits the minimum-effort coordination game with a continuum of Paretoranked Nash equilibria. Noise is introduced via a logit probabilistic choice function. The resulting logit equilibrium distribution of decisions is unique and maximizes a stochastic potential function. In the limit as the noise vanishes, the distribution converges to an outcome that is analogous to the risk-domin...
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This paper presents a simple model to show that, in addition to technological development and global outsourcing, heterogeneous lifetime preferences for leisure are essential to income inequality. Allocating leisure time to studying is viewed as suffering in exchange for future comfort, and income inequality in a country arises when some prefer the leisure trade-off but others prefer smooth lei...
متن کاملMinimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply
It is well-known that, in static models, minimum wages generate positive worker rents and, consequently, inefficiently low effort. We show that this result does not necessarily extend to a dynamic context. The reason is that, in repeated employment relationships, firms may exploit workers’ future rents to induce excessively high effort.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2020.05.009