Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action

Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action

In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets. JEL Codes: C72, D30, D70, O10, P0

Inequality and Collective Action

We analyze the e ect of inequality in the distribution of endowment of private inputs (e.g., land, wealth) that are complementary in production with collective inputs (e.g., contribution to public goods such as irrigation and extraction from common-property resources) on eÆciency in a simple class of collective action problems. In an environment where transaction costs prevent the eÆcient alloc...

Inequality in Collective Action Problems

Coalitions in Action Logic

If modal logics for coalitions need to be applied, one must know how to translate coalition power into agents’ actions. To these days, the connection between coalition power and the actions of the agents has not been studied in the literature. This paper fills the gap by presenting a semantic translation from Pauly’s Coalition Logic to a (fragment of an) action logic. The interpretation of the ...

Collective strength, collective action.

During the past decade, infection prevention programs have been presented with an unending series of challenges and expectations. The challenges, more often than not, have resulted in additional responsibilities, functions, and workload for infection control professionals (ICPs) and healthcare epidemiologists. These additional responsibilities have not been accompanied by proportional increases...