Inefficient rushes in auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Inefficient rushes in auctions
We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second main result is that the second bes...
متن کاملIne � cient rushes in auctions ⇤
We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders and takeovers in which the ex post e cient allocation, i.e. the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e. all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its e ciency. Our second main result is that the second best can b...
متن کاملSupplementary appendix to ” Ine � cient Rushes in auctions ”
Ángel Hernando-Veciana (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid) and Fabio Michelucci (CERGE-EI) January 12, 2017 A Auxiliary Results A Necessary Condition for the Incumbent’s Incentive Compatibility Lemma 4. A direct mechanism (p, x) is incentive compatible for the incumbent only if Q 1 (s 1 , p) in (13) is increasing in s 1 . Proof. Let X 1 (s 1 , x) ⌘ R [0,1]n x1(s1, s 1)dF 1(s 1). An incumbent wit...
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For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategyproof and efficient. However, the VCG mechanism is not strongly budget balanced: in general, value flows out of the system of agents in the form of VCG payments, which reduces the agents’ utilities. In many settings, the objective is to maximize the sum of the ...
متن کاملInefficient Equilibria of Second-Price/English Auctions with Resale
In second-price or English auctions involving symmetric, independent, private-value bidders the equilibrium outcome may not be efficient if resale is allowed. In addition to the efficient, symmetric equilibrium there exist inefficient, asymmetric equilibria in which the bidder who wins the item offers it for resale to the losers. For the case where the reserve price in the initial auction equal...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te2513