Inefficient Pre-Bargaining Search

Inefficient pre-bargaining search

The MIT Faculty has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Abstract We identify conditions under which a bargainer makes inefficiently large (small) investments in search for information about the opponent's reservation price. The analysis starts with the observation that a player will invest too much (too little) if the opponent's exp...

INEFFICIENT PRE-BARGAINING SEARCH By

Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining

We study a complete-information alternating-offer bargaining game in which one “active” player bargainswith each of a number of other “passive” players one at a time. In contrast to most existing models, the order of reaching agreements is endogenously determined, hence the active player can “play off” some passive players against others bymoving back and forth bargainingwith the passive player...

Deadline Effects and Inefficient Delay in Bargaining with Endogenous Commitment

Negotiations often take time, thereby delaying the implementation of agreements which are to the mutual advantage of the bargaining partners. If the negotiators are all impatient, then these delayed agreements must be inefficient, as all participants must strictly prefer an immediate agreement on the same terms. The inefficiency of delayed agreements poses an important explanatory question: Why...

Inefficient visual search for second-order motion.

Visual search rate was used to assess attentional resources required for detection of opposing motions defined either by luminance or by modulations of texture contrast, flicker, or size. Though luminance-based targets were detected quickly, search through second-order motion was slow. Control experiments ruled out stimuli visibility, complexity, eccentricity sensitivity, and attributes of the ...