Inefficient Job Destructions and Training with Hold-up
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Endogenous Job Destructions and the Distribution of Wages
In this paper, we argue that firing decisions of firms can help explain the shape of the wage distribution. To emphasize this result, we consider a matching model with both idiosyncratic productivity shocks that hit jobs and heterogeneity of workers according to ex ante unobservable abilities. Computation experiments show that the model can generate a hump-shaped wage distribution despite assum...
متن کاملJob Competition, Hold-ups and Efficiency
We consider an auction-theoretic model of the labour market to study hold-up problems in markets with frictions. Firms have to invest in capital before they can advertise a job, while unemployed workers apply for jobs by bidding in auctions. This non-cooperative application procedure generates a distribution of applicants across jobs, and our aim is to investigate how the competition among appl...
متن کاملInjunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties
This paper studies royalty negotiations between a patent holder and a downstream firm selling a product which is more valuable if it includes a feature covered by the patent. Royalties are negotiated in the shadow of patent litigation, which will determine whether or not the patent is valid and infringed. If the two firms negotiate after the downstream firm has already designed its product to i...
متن کاملRelational Contracting, Repeated Negotiations, and Hold-Up∗
We propose a unified framework to study relational contracting and hold-up problems in infinite horizon stochastic games. We illustrate that with respect to long run decisions, the common formulation of relational contracts as Pareto-optimal public perfect equilibria is in stark contrast to fundamental assumptions of hold-up models. We develop a model in which relational contracts are repeatedl...
متن کاملHold-Up and Durable Trading Opportunities
This paper examines a contractual setting with unverifiable investment and a durable trading opportunity, in which trade can take place in any one of an infinite number of periods. The contractual setting features cross-investment, meaning that the seller’s investment affects the buyer’s benefit of trade. Two different trade technologies are studied, one in which the seller has the individual a...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: LABOUR
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1121-7081
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9914.2011.00526.x