Inefficiency in Legislative Policymaking: A Dynamic Analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ine ffi ciency in Legislative Policy - Making : A Dynamic Analysis
This paper develops an infinite horizon model of public spending and taxation in which policy decisions are determined by legislative bargaining. The policy space incorporates both productive and distributive public spending and distortionary taxation. The productive spending is investing in a public good that benefits all citizens (e.g., national defense or air quality) and the distributive sp...
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It is often said that the only constant is change itself. As time passes, the population grows, new technologies are invented, and the skills, demographics, and norms of the populace evolve. These changes, whether in isolation or in aggregate, impact the effectiveness of policy. In particular, policies designed for today’s world are unlikely to provide a perfect fit tomorrow. In this paper we d...
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We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative policy making in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities. We prove that all such equilibria are essentially in pure strategies and that proposal strategies are differentiable...
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The price of anarchy [16] is by now a standard measure for quantifying the inefficiency introduced in games due to selfish behavior, and is defined as the ratio between the optimal outcome and the worst Nash equilibrium. However, this notion is well defined only for games that always possess a Nash equilibrium (NE). We propose the dynamic inefficiency measure, which is roughly defined as the av...
متن کاملA Dynamic Model of Legislative Bargaining
We prove existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in an infinite-horizon model of legislative bargaining in which the policy outcome in one period determines the status quo in the next. We allow for a multidimensional policy space and arbitrary smooth stage utilities. We prove that all such equilibria are essentially in pure strategies and that proposal strategies are differentiable al...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The American Economic Review
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/000282807780323424