Inefficiency and complementarity in sharing games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Design
سال: 2008
ISSN: 1434-4742,1434-4750
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0065-4