Industry structure and collusion with uniform yardstick competition: Theory and experiments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Industrial Organization
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.10.001