Inducing cooperation by reciprocative strategy in non-zero-sum games

inducing Cooperation by Reciprocative Strategy in Non - Zero - Sum Games

In this paper, we investigate the use of reciprocative strategy to induce cooperative behavior in non-zero-sum games. Reciprocative behavior is defined mathematically in the context of a two-person non-zero-sum game in which both the players have a common set of pure strategies. Conditions under which mutual cooperative behavior results when one of the players responds optimally to reciprocativ...

Non-Zero Sum Games for Reactive Synthesis

In this invited contribution [7], we summarize new solution concepts useful for the synthesis of reactive systems that we have introduced in several recent publications. These solution concepts are developed in the context of non-zero sum games played on graphs. They are part of the contributions obtained in the inVEST project funded by the European Research Council.

Non-zero-sum Dresher inspection games

An inspection game is here a non-cooperative two-person-game between an inspector and an inspectee. It models a situation where the inspector controls the inspectee who has an incentive to violate certain legal obligations. A recent survey of inspection games applied to data verification, for example in nuclear material safeguards, is given in [1]. Dresher [2] described a sequential inspection ...

Repeated Games Non - Zero - Sum of Incomplete

Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games

We show that a symmetric two-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy equilibrium if and only if it is not a generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix. Moreover, we show that every finite symmetric quasiconcave two-player zero-sum game has a pure equilibrium. Further sufficient conditions for existence are provided. We point out that the class of symmetric two-player zero-sum games coincides with ...