Induced Price Leadership and (Counter-)spying Rivals’ Play Under Incomplete Information

Inspector Leadership with Incomplete Information

Inspection problems arise when an inspector has to decide whether an inspectee has behaved legally, i.e., according to a formal agreement. For such a decision the inspector uses a well-defined procedure which is based on observations of random variables and which may or may not be announced to the inspectee. Whereas in the latter case (no announcement) in equilibrium the inspectee will behave i...

Bargaining under Incomplete Information

Skill Formation under Incomplete Information

We consider an economic model of child development with multiple stages. Due to incomplete information, parents are not able to tailor their investments to their child's type when the child is young. We show that incomplete information weakens the importance of early investments in children when inter-stage investments are easily substitutable, but strengthens them when substitution is difficul...

Hedging Demands under Incomplete Information

I present a model of consumption and portfolio choice under market incompleteness and imperfect information regarding the investment opportunity set. I solve analytically the consumption and portfolio choice problem for an investor learning about the true state of the economy. When prices are the only observations, the previously unspanned state variables are spanned by the market securities un...

Utilitarian Cooperation under Incomplete Information∗

A theory of cooperative choice under incomplete information is developed in which agents possess private information at the time of contracting. It is assumed that the group of cooperating agents has agreed on a utilitarian “standard of fairness” (group preference ordering) governing choices under complete information. The task is to extend this standard to choices whose consequences depend on ...