Indoctrination, Coercion and Freedom of Will
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Indoctrination, Coercion, and Freedom of Will
Manipulation by another person often undermines freedom. To explain this, a distinction is drawn between two forms of manipulation: indoctrination is defined as causing another person to respond to reasons in a pattern that serves the manipulator’s ends; coercion as supplying another person with reasons that, given the pattern in which he responds to reasons, lead him to act in ways that serve ...
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Can absolute freedom of will be defended by arguing that apparent cases of diminished freedom when we act out of passion are cases of weakness of will? Rogers Albritton thought so. What is intriguing about Albritton’s view is that he thought when we act from desire we are making choices, yet our desires are not functioning as reasons for those choices. So our desires must be influencing our cho...
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In human societies, cooperative behavior in joint enterprises is often enforced through institutions that impose sanctions on defectors. Many experiments on so-called public goods games have shown that in the absence of such institutions, individuals are willing to punish defectors, even at a cost to themselves. Theoretical models confirm that social norms prescribing the punishment of uncooper...
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In this paper we are attempting in the context of recent developments in cognitive science to examine the viability of the Libet solution to the problem of the freedom of the will. We will be showing that this solution is still possible if refraining acts can be considered not only as different kinds of actions from performing acts, but also peculiar actions that have causal consequences withou...
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In defending absolute freedom of the will, Albritton distinguishes freedom of will from two other notions with which it is often confused. First, he argues decisively against the pervasive tendency to identify freedom of will with freedom of (bodily) action.[2] To restrict someone's freedom of movement, by putting him in chains or even by administering curare, is not to diminish the will's free...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0031-8205,1933-1592
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2003.tb00293.x