Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanisms and the Informed Principal Problem
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Individually Rational, Balanced-Budget Bayesian Mechanisms and the Informed Principal Problem
We investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex-post budgetbalanced Bayesian mechanisms. We show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative expected social surplus are implementable if and only if the probability distribution of the agents’ types satisfies two conditions: the well-known condition of Crémer and McLean (1985) and the Identifiability condition introdu...
متن کاملIndividually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus
We investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex-post budget-balanced Bayesian mechanisms. We show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative expected social surplus are implementable via such mechanisms if and only if the probability distribution of the agents’ type profiles satisfies two conditions: the well-known condition of Crémer and McLean [1988. Full extract...
متن کاملBalanced Bayesian mechanisms
We present a new condition on beliefs that guarantee the Bayesian implementability of all efficient social decision rules. We show that this condition is easy to verify and is both more interpretable and more general than the conditions that are found in the literature. We also study conditions guaranteeing the Bayesian implementability of all social decision rules with balanced budget mechanisms.
متن کاملBalanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information
We examine mechanism design with transferable utility and budget balance, using techniques we developed for the study of repeated games. We show that with independent types, budget balance does not limit the set of social choice functions that can be implemented. With correlated types and three or more players, budget balance is again not a constraint if no player has "too many" more possible t...
متن کاملModeling collusion as an informed principal problem∗
In this paper we address the question of collusion in mechanisms under asymmetric information by assuming that one of the colluding parties offers a side contract to the other one. We develop a methodology to analyze collusion as an informed principal problem. We show that if collusion occurs after the agents accept or reject the principal’s offer, the dominant-strategy implementation of the op...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.628621