Individual wealth-based selection supports cooperation in spatial public goods games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Individual wealth-based selection supports cooperation in spatial public goods games
In a social dilemma game group members are allowed to decide if they contribute to the joint venture or not. As a consequence, defectors, who do not invest but only enjoy the mutual benefit, prevail and the system evolves onto the tragedy of the common state. This unfortunate scenario can be avoided if participation is not obligatory but only happens with a given probability. But what if we als...
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Most previous studies involving public goods games are investigated under a simplifying assumption that participation is either compulsive or unidirectional optional in collective interactions. Nevertheless, how the mutual selection rule, a more realistic participation mode, affects the evolution of cooperation in structured populations is still unclear. Here we introduce a reputation-based mut...
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Evolution of cooperation has been a major issue in evolutionary biology. Cooperation is observed not only in dyadic interactions, but also in social interactions involving more than two individuals. It has been argued that direct reciprocity cannot explain the emergence of cooperation in large groups because the basin of attraction for the 'cooperative' equilibrium state shrinks rapidly as the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Scientific Reports
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2045-2322
DOI: 10.1038/srep32802